CBI Special Courts/Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PCA)/ CBI विशेष न्यायालय /भ्रष्टाचार निवारण अधिनियम, 1988 (PCA)

About  CBI Special Courts :

CBI Special Courts are specialized judicial bodies in India established to adjudicate cases investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), focusing on corruption, economic offenses, and serious crimes. They derive their authority from the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PCA) and the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946, ensuring swift and specialized trials.

Legal Foundation:

• ● Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PCA):
  Section 3 of the PCA empowers the central government to establish Special Courts for trying offenses under the Act, such as bribery (Section 7) and criminal misconduct by public servants (Section 13). These courts are notified in consultation with the Chief Justice of the respective High Court.
• ● Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946:
  Section 5 of the DSPE Act allows the CBI to investigate offenses across India with central government consent, while Section 6 requires state government consent for state-level probes. CBI Special Courts adjudicate these cases, often when transferred by higher courts under Section 4(2) powers.

Powers of CBI Special Courts:

• Exclusive Jurisdiction:
  They have exclusive authority to try CBI-investigated cases, including PCA offenses, economic frauds (e.g., bank scams), and other crimes assigned by the Supreme Court or High Courts, bypassing regular courts for efficiency.
•  Trial Powers:
  Special Judges exercise powers equivalent to a Sessions Court under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) (replacing CrPC, 1973, from July 1, 2024). They can summon witnesses (BNSS Section 253), issue warrants (BNSS Section 72), and impose sentences up to life imprisonment or death, subject to appeal.
• Speedy Disposal Mandate:
  Mandated to expedite trials, they aim to conclude cases within 2 years post-2018 PCA amendments (Section 4(4)), though backlogs persist, with over 6,900 cases pending as of March 2025, per Amit Shah’s Rajya Sabha statement.
• ● Sanction Oversight:
  They verify prior sanction for prosecuting public servants under PCA Section 19, ensuring legal compliance before trials, a power critical to anti-corruption cases.
• Evidence and Procedure:
  Authority to admit electronic evidence (BNSS Section 176) and conduct trials in absentia (BNSS Section 356) for absconding accused, enhancing procedural flexibility over CrPC provisions.
•  Contempt and Enforcement:
  Possess contempt powers akin to High Courts under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, ensuring compliance with orders, and can enforce CBI seizures or arrests (BNSS Sections 49-50).

Operational Framework:

• Establishment and Appointment:
  Central government notifies Special Courts, appointing Special Judges (typically District Judge rank) with expertise in criminal law, in consultation with the High Court Chief Justice, as per PCA Section 3.
• Case Assignment:
  Cases reach these courts via CBI charge sheets filed under BNSS Section 193 or through Supreme Court/High Court directives (e.g., post-poll violence cases in West Bengal, as noted by Amit Shah on March 19, 2025).
• Regional Presence:
  Operate across states, e.g., 9 courts in Telangana under a Principal Special Judge, but none functional in West Bengal (March 2025), highlighting state-specific challenges due to consent withdrawal (2018) and infrastructure gaps.
• Appeals:
  Judgments appealable to High Courts within 90 days (BNSS Section 418), ensuring oversight while maintaining trial court autonomy.

Significance and Challenges:

•  Anti-Corruption Role:
  Pivotal in enforcing PCA, they’ve delivered landmark verdicts, like the January 2025 life sentence in the RG Kar case (Sealdah CBI Court), reinforcing accountability.
•  Federal Tensions:
  State consent under DSPE Act Section 6 limits CBI’s reach, impacting court functionality where states like West Bengal resist, as Shah criticized, stalling 6,900+ cases.
•  Resource Constraints:
  Vacancies and lack of courts (e.g., West Bengal) hinder their mandate, despite their robust powers, reflecting systemic judicial bottlenecks.